trinity-users@lists.pearsoncomputing.net

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Month: July 2015

Re: [trinity-users] Messages from Jonesy bouncing was: Re: [trinity-users] Konqueror automatic http:// prefix in url address

From: Lisi Reisz <lisi.reisz@...>
Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2015 23:49:01 +0100
On Monday 06 July 2015 23:20:49 Timothy Pearson wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA224
>
> > On Mon, 6 Jul 2015, E. Liddell wrote:
> >>On Mon, 06 Jul 2015 12:09:13 +0100
> >>
> >>Andrew Young <mail@...> wrote:
> >>> On 06/07/15 12:01, E. Liddell wrote:
> >>> > The possible solutions that occur to me are three:
> >>> >
> >>> > 1. Whack GMail over the collective head with a blunt instrument until
> >>>
> >>> it behaves
> >>>
> >>> >    itself (good luck on that)
> >>> > 2. Have the list mailer check for key phrases in bounce messages and
> >>>
> >>> ignore
> >>>
> >>> >    them if they're found
> >>> > 3. Increase the list mailer's bounce tolerance to 5-10 messages, and
> >>>
> >>> have
> >>>
> >>> >    affected users use a filter to auto-trash the messages unread.
> >>> >
> >>> > I'm pretty sure I've been unsubscribed without noticing (because I do
> >>>
> >>> auto-trash
> >>>
> >>> > the "threat messages") at least once--that would have been around
> >>>
> >>> April 1 of last
> >>>
> >>> > year.
> >>>
> >>> 4. Use a different mail list backend.
> >>
> >>Do you know of any that specifically work around Google's overzealous
> >> filters?
> >>If not, I doubt it would help--unsubscribing dead accounts is a
> >> reasonable thing
> >>for ML software to do, and checking whether or not messages to the
> >> account
> >>bounce is an easy way to do it . . .
> >
> > Hello from "Jonesy".  One of you _not_ using Gmail or other email
> > systems that do not check for a valid DKIM-Signature and SPF record,
> > should re-forward this from _your_ email account to the list for others
> > to see.
> >
> > The lists.pearsoncomputing.net is re-emailing all subscribed incoming
> > emails to the user list.  Each of those emails _claims_ to be From: the
> > original sender.  But, when Gmail (or whoever) asks if the original
> > sender (e.g. Jonesy <trinity@...> ) is authorized to send via that
> > MTA, the answer is "NO".  Of course not.  I have no user account there.
> >
> > The problem has been solved by many of the re-mailers/email reflectors.
> > For instance, one of the ham radio reflectors (called "rover") I belong
> > to now construct the From:
> > viz:
> > 	From: Jonesy W3DHJ via Rover <rover@...>
> >
> > Ergo, when gmail asks if rover@... is a permitted sender at
> > mailman.qth.net, the answer is "YES".
> >
> > Andrew Young's answer to the problem:
> >   "4. Use a different mail list backend"
> > is the correct answer.
> >
> > For a little light reading on the matter:
> >
> >     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DomainKeys_Identified_Mail
> >
> > As for its purpose, it SURE cuts down on the spam coming from botnets
> > with forged From: headers -- _if_ the forged domain supports DKIM.
> > And, my email server supports DKIM.
>
> Just to chime in real quick, I have been aware of the problem and it's
> "solution" for a while now.  There are some drawbacks to just re-writing
> the headers and as the list software currently in use by the TDE project
> has issues with properly rewriting the headers I've just been leaving the
> list alone at the moment.  At some point this will need to change, but I
> wanted to let some time elapse first in the hopes that the list software
> would be updated to "natively" support DKIM.

Tim -

I quite understand, and you have more important things to do.  But could you 
not just up the number before we are chucked off?  That seems to work with 
Debian.  Besides having a much kinder message, they give you far more 
chances.  Quite  a large number in a week before you are chucked off, not 
just one.  (Presumably bots are persistent.)

Or is changing anything a big fiddle?

Lisi